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Abstract: 
A number of influential studies have documented a considerable value premium for 
US stocks over long time periods (Fama and French (1992, 2008), Lakonishok et al. 
(1994)). Stocks with low price-earnings multiples, price-book values and other 
measures of value are reported to have given a higher mean return than stocks with 
high multiples and high asset growth (Cooper et al. (2008)). Outside the US, the 
evidence is more uncertain due to data shortages. On the basis of a unique data set 
that extends over more than half a century, this paper not only shows that there is a 
value premium in the Danish market but also that growth stocks only produce high 
earnings growth in the run-up to portfolio formation. Growth stocks are therefore 
likely to have disappointed investors. We therefore also estimate the proportion of the 
premium that can be explained by growth stocks’ earnings disappointment. 
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Introduction 
A number of influential studies have documented a considerable value premium for 
US stocks over long time periods (Fama and French (1992 and 2008), Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994)). Stocks with low price-earnings multiples, price-book 
values and other measures of value are reported to have given a higher mean return 
than stocks with high valuation ratios and high asset growth (Cooper, Gulen and 
Schill (2008)). Work by Basu (1997) and others have shown that the value 
dominance is also a feature of the early market history of the United States as noted 
also by Graham and Dodd (1934). 
  
Notwithstanding that value stocks frequently outperform growth stocks there are of 
course time periods with a negative premium. The US value premium disappeared for 
example in the late 1990s. Chan et al. (2000) argue that this reflects that investors got 
too excited about growth stocks. Anticipating the bursting of the bubble, they 
predicted that the historic cross sectional return pattern would be reestablished.  
 
Outside the US, the evidence on the value premium is more uncertain due to data 
shortages. With a few exceptions, the studies of European and Asian markets are 
based on data which at maximum only extends over two decades. And since the value 
premium is volatile this is rendering the evidence less robust.1 There is therefore a 
need for more research in particular on European and Asian markets.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to report evidence on the Danish value premium and in 
particular to investigate whether the premium is a long-term characteristic of the 
market or just a phenomenon that pops up now and then. To research this issue we 
have collected stock market and accounting data for more than half a century, that is, 
for the period 1950-2004. The results show that there is also a value premium in the 
Danish market though the premium is by no means a simple constant. The premium 
displays considerable volatility even across decades, which underscores the need for 
long samples in order to extract robust information. The appearance of the value 
                                           
1 Arshanapalli et al. (1998) find a value premium in the majority of the 17 non-US countries they look at over the period 
1975-1995. Bauman et al. (2001) document a value premium for 6 Pacific Rim countries over 1986-1996. Brouwer et 
al. (1997) looked at France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK over the period 1982-1993 and also found evidence 
of a premium as did earlier work by Capaul et al. (1993), but their sample only included 10 years.  Chan et al. (1991) 
find a value premium in Japan in the period 1971 to 1988. In a sample of 12 developed countries over a 20-year period, 
Fama and French (1998) also establish evidence of a premium in 11 out of the 12 countries. Moreover, they also find a 
premium in emerging market economies but the sample length is only 9 years. A UK study by Gregory et al. (2001) 
uses a data set that is longer than the norm, that is, their data runs over the period 1975-1998 and is also consistent with 
the existence of a premium. Dimson et al. (2003) is the clearest exception to the rule of short samples since their UK 
data extends over the period 1955-2001. They argue that in order to capture the value premium in the UK, traders have 
to pay particular attention to trading costs given that the majority of the value stocks are in the small cap segment.  The 
present paper is the first one which analyzes Danish data. I am not aware of any extensive analysis of the other Nordic 
markets  
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premium in long time series outside the US also reduces the risk that the US value 
premium is sample specific and unlikely to recur in future returns (Black 1993)). 
 
Following the presentation of the value premium we explore potential explanations of 
why we have a premium in the first place. This casts new light on the rivalry 
explanations offered in the literature, cf. below. Fama and French (1992, 1998) 
explain the premium by reference to risk. In their view value stocks are therefore 
more risky than growth stocks. Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue on the other hand that 
the premium reflects mispricing. They also provide evidence for the hypothesis that 
the market frequently gets too excited about growth stocks, which subsequently leads 
to a correction and therefore to a poor return performance, see also Dreman and Berry 
(1995) and La Porta et al. (1997). Although the bursting of the technology bubble in 
2000 offered additional support for this view, it would be inappropriate to dismiss the 
risk explanation.2 We therefore also examine the extent to which different risk 
measures can explain the premium.  
 
Following this we address the alternative view that growth companies often 
disappoint investors. A first test of this hypothesis is to compare earnings growth 
before and after portfolio formation. If growth stocks have much higher earnings 
growth in the run-up to portfolio formation, there is a basis for arguing that growth 
stocks could have disappointed investors (Lakonishok et al. (1994)). The evidence 
presented in this paper shows that growth stocks over more than half a century have 
produced higher earnings prior to than after portfolio formation. We therefore take 
this hypothesis one step further by also estimating the proportion of the premium that 
can be explained by earnings disappointment. To this end we present an econometric 
model that explains the returns by the difference in earnings growth before and after 
portfolio formation. The results suggest that the decline in earnings growth following 
the formation of the growth portfolio is an important factor in explaining the low 
return on growth stocks and hence the value premium.    
 
This paper deals with long-term stock market strategies. However, it is worth 
mentioning that there is also another literature on weekly or monthly trading 
strategies. This literature often finds support for the momentum strategy and hence 
emphasizes the attractiveness of investing in shares that are on the way up 
disregarding their valuation ratios (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)). A recent study of 
this phenomenon is Ree and Schmid (2007) who document a significant risk adjusted 
momentum effect in Swiss large cap stocks. Broadly speaking, the two strands of 
literature suggest that momentum strategies frequently make sense in the short term 
while value strategies tend to outperform in the long term. 
 
                                           
2 On this issue see Chan et al. (2000) and Shiller (2000). 
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The paper is in five sections. Section I outlines the data and the formation of the 
value and the growth portfolio. Section II presents the Danish value premium over 
the period 1950 to 2004. Section III discusses different risk explanations in the spirit 
of Lakonishok et al. (1994). Section IV then goes on to present econometric tests of 
the earnings disappointment hypothesis. Section V concludes. 
 
I. Data and Portfolio Formation 
In the absence of an official data source we have compiled the relevant accounting 
and stock market data. The sample covers the Danish large cap universe. Due to the 
moderate size of the market, these stocks account for a high proportion of the 
market’s capitalization.3  
 
The sample runs from 1950 to 2004. At the end of each year we select the 20 largest 
stocks (firms) by market capitalization. In case firms have two share classes, we only 
include the liquid B shares. This approach minimizes the risk that the premium could 
reflect liquidity differences. From 1989 and onwards the universe is essentially 
identical to the set of stocks that have entered the Blue Chip price index first 
introduced in 1989 and now labeled the OMX C-20.  
 
Next we form value and growth portfolios on the basis of the stocks’ P/E multiples. 
The value portfolio includes the 10 stocks with the lowest P/E, and the growth 
portfolio includes the 10 stocks with the highest P/E.4 Following end-of-year 
portfolio formation, returns are calculated for the following year assuming a 1-year 
holding period. We later examine long-term buy and hold strategies. 
 
Portfolios are formed on the basis of both current and trailing P/E multiples. Current 
P/E is defined as end-of-year P relative to reported earnings E over the year. Because 
investors at year-ends only know E for the first 9 months, this approach assumes that 
they were able to make a forecast of fourth quarter E. However, since this approach 
can be criticized for a look-ahead bias, we also consider the case where the portfolio 
formation is based on annual earnings in the preceding year. Given that annual 
earnings reports are available at the end of the first quarter, this approach can not be 
criticized for being informational too demanding, on the contrary.5 However, even in 
that case we will see that there is a value premium. 
 
                                           
3 Risager (2006) outlines  returns and valuation trends from 1969 and onwards. This paper also describes the 
methodology underlying the calculations. 
4 The universe of stocks (and the two portfolios) is changing over time since we always work with the 20 largest 
companies.  
5 Prior to the 1990s, investors only received semi-annual and annual earnings reports making it harder to estimate 
current P/E ratios. This approach can therefore be criticized for being too demanding, whereas the trailing P/E approach 
is likely to demand too little from investors. The realistic benefits of forming e.g. value strategies is therefore likely to 
lie in between the returns associated with the two P/E sorting methods. 
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Because we report value-weighted returns we control for a potential size effect. As 
the returns take into account bankruptcies, the data is also free of survivor biases.  We 
will later discuss the role of business failures since that turns out to be of some 
importance for the results in the early 1990s.  
 
As in Lakonishok et al. (1994) and Fama and French (1998) it is only stocks with 
positive earnings that enter the portfolios.6 If firms later produce poor returns due to 
negative earnings, return calculations take this into account. 
 
II. Statistics on the Danish Value Premium 
Table 1 shows that the mean value premium equals 5.7 percent when the portfolio 
formation is based on current P/E ratios. The premium declines to 4.2 percent when 
stocks are sorted on the basis of trailing P/E multiples. Thus, value investors benefit 
relative to growth investors from using the most up-to-date earnings information. 
This is by no means an obvious result. We return to this when we discuss the 
potential explanations of the premium.7
 
Table 1: Returns for Value, Growth and the Market: 1951 to 2004 
 Low P/E 
(Current) 
High P/E 
(Current) 
Value 
Premium
(Current)
Market Low P/E (Trailing)
High P/E 
(Trailing) 
Value 
Premium 
(Trailing)
Market
R1(Mean) 0.160 0.103 0.057 0.131 0.152 0.110 0.042 0.130 
Std. 0.270 0.245 0.122 0.249 0.287 0.241 0.157 0.249 
Std.Error 0.037 0.033 0.017 0.034 0.039 0.033 0.021 0.034 
t(Mean) 4.36 3.10 3.44 3.86 3.87 3.34 1.95 3.80 
R1 is the mean of the annual returns. Std. is the standard deviation of the returns. Std.Err. is the standard error of the 
mean. The conventional t-statistic is the R1 (Mean) relative to the Std.Err. There are 54 (53) observations when 
portfolios are formed on the basis of current (trailing) P/E ratios. 
 
 
The premium based on current P/E multiples is displayed in Figure 1. As shown, the 
premium is positive and substantial in the majority of the 10-year periods. It is only 
in the 1990s that growth stocks produce a marginal higher return than value stocks. In 
this sense the premium looks like a stylized fact even though the premium is volatile. 
The highest premium is recorded in the 1980s. The 1980s are therefore the golden 
age for Danish value stocks. The lowest premium is in the 1990s with an annual 
mean at -0.9 percent. A banking sector crisis in the early 1990s and a strong investor 
appetite for growth stocks in the late 1990s are key explanations of the low premium 
                                           
6 This does not lead to any biases since the premium is an unbiased estimate of the return difference between large value 
and growth stocks that belong to the set of stocks with positive earnings. 
7 The Danish premium is higher than the average premium reported in Fama and French (1998, Table III, Col. 8). They 
find that the 12 country average equals 3.8 percent over the period 1975-95.  
 6
in this decade, see section III. Following the 1990s, the value premium recovers in 
the new millennium.8   
 
Figure 1: 1-Year and 10-Year Annualized Value Premium (Current P/E)
-0,3
-0,2
-0,1
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
19
51
19
54
19
57
19
60
19
63
19
66
19
69
19
72
19
75
19
78
19
81
19
84
19
87
19
90
19
93
19
96
19
99
20
02
Based on current P/E ratios. The 10-Year premium (bold line) is the 
annualized premium per decade.
Pr
em
iu
m
0,035 0,038 0,037
0,147
-0,009
0,126
 
 
Sorting stocks on the basis of trailing P/E ratios produces the value premium in 
Figure 2. Broadly speaking, the behavior is similar to what we have seen. That said, 
two important differences stand out: First, in this case there is a small positive 
premium in the 1990s. Second, the 1970s are now characterized by a negative 
premium. This is also a decade with poor macroeconomic performance and two large  
 
Figure 2: 1-Year and 10-Year Value Premium (Trailing P/E)
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8 This result also holds had we included 2005-07. 
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oil shocks. We later discuss whether and to what extent value stocks are more 
sensitive to business cycle fluctuations than growth stocks. 
 
So far we have looked at 1-year holding periods. Table 2 shows that the value 
premium is also evident in the second and the third year after portfolio formation. 
Over a 3-year investment horizon, there is therefore no evidence that growth stocks 
eventually catch up and out perform value stocks. 
 
Table 2: Returns for Buy and Hold Value and Growth Portfolios over         
longer Holding Periods 
 Low P/E (Current) 
High P/E 
(Current) 
Value 
Premium 
(Current) 
Low P/E 
(Trailing) 
High P/E 
(Trailing) 
Value 
Premium 
(Trailing) 
R1 0.160 0.103 0.057 0.152 0.110 0.042 
R2 0.146 0.087 0.059 0.135 0.095 0.040 
R3 0.140 0.084 0.056 0.128 0.091 0.037 
WT 912.9 61.6 Factor 14.8 469.9 85.2 Factor 5.5 
 
Rt is the average geometric return when the holding period is t years. WT is the nominal wealth level in 
T=2004 from a one Dollar investment at the end of 1950 (current P/E case) or at the end of 1951 (Trailing 
P/E case), assuming annual rebalancing.  
 
The value premium is important from an economic point of view. Table 2 shows that 
the cumulative wealth level in 2004 of investing in value stocks at the beginning of 
the sample period is 14.8 times the outcome of investing in growth stocks.9 The 
premium is also statistically significant when stocks are sorted on the basis of current 
P/E multiples. In that case, the t-statistic equals 3.44. When stocks are sorted on the 
basis of trailing P/E ratios, the t-value equals 1.95, see Table 1. 
 
Our sample includes both financial and non-financial firms whereas Fama and French 
(1992) and Lakonishok et al. (1994) only look at non-financial firms. However, 
Barber and Lyon (1997) later showed that the US value premium also exists for 
financial firms. When we exclude banks, the mean value premium equals 7.3 percent. 
In this case the two portfolios sometimes only include 7 stocks, which means that we 
should not draw strong conclusions from this finding. 
 
Let us then turn to other characteristics of value stocks. The first thing to note is that 
value stocks pay more in dividends than growth stocks. In for example the trailing 
P/E case, the mean dividend yield is 1.0 percentage point higher on value stocks. 
Only in 12 out of 53 years do growth stocks produce a dividend yield that is at the 
                                           
9 Value generates 5.5 times more wealth when stocks are sorted using trailing P/E multiples. 
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same level or exceeds the dividend yield on value stocks. It should also be noted that 
the value premium cannot be traced to a size effect given that value stocks have on 
average a 6 percent higher market cap than growth stocks, see Table 3 below.  
 
Finally, the value premium cannot be explained by transaction costs simply because 
the value strategy does not entail a higher number of transactions.10 In the next 
section we discuss whether and to what extent the value premium can be explained 
by different risk factors. In the analysis of this issue we use the most conservative 
estimate of the premium, namely, the one based on trailing P/E multiples. 
 
III. Are Value Strategies Riskier? 
In order to answer this question we look at three different risk measures. We begin 
with the simplest indicator of risk, namely, the standard deviation of returns. Next we 
discuss risk in a CAPM sense. Finally, we ask whether value stocks are a poorer 
hedge against macroeconomic recessions.  
 
As shown by Table 3, the value portfolio has the highest standard deviation but this 
does not necessarily translate into higher risk since the distributions are non-
symmetric. Both portfolios exhibit excess kurtosis (fat tails). 
 
Table 3: Statistics on the Value and Growth Portfolio and the 
Premium under Trailing P/E 
 Low P/E High P/E Premium 
R1 (Mean) 0.152 0.110 0.042 
Std. 0.287 0.241 0.157 
Size1) 1.067 1.000  
Cov(portf, 
market) 
0.069 0.057  
Skewness 1.655 1.436 0.602 
Excess Kurtosis 3.113 3.504 0.443 
Minimum -0.224 -0.332 -0.272 
Maximum 1.151 1.012 0.426 
Normality 
CHI2(2) 
29.21 (0.000) 14.78 (0.001) 3.54 (0.170) 
             1) Defined as mean ratio of market cap of firms in the value portfolio relative to the growth 
portfolio.  
 
                                           
10 Note that this is different from the finding in Dimson et al. (2003). They  identify a value premium in small caps with 
high trading costs. As noted this calls for a skillful approach to trading in order not to be swamped by trading costs . By 
construction, our sample consists only of large caps. The effect of trading costs is therefore the same on the two 
portfolios. 
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The extreme returns of the growth portfolio are, however, in particular in the negative 
range of the distribution. The table therefore also shows that the growth portfolio has 
produced the worst return over the sample period (equal to -33.2 percent). By 
contrast, the value portfolio has more upside risk. The value portfolio has therefore 
also produced the highest return (equal to 115.1 percent). Because the value portfolio 
has more upside risk, the value premium is also skewed to right as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
                           Figure 3: Density Value Premium 
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The growth portfolio’s higher downside risk and the value portfolio’s higher upside 
risk explain why the higher standard deviation of the value portfolio is not necessarily 
equivalent with higher risk in the economic sense.  
 
In order to find out whether value stocks are more risky we reconstruct the return 
distributions, assuming that the right side is a mirror image of the left side (we 
remove the higher upside risk associated in particular with the value portfolio). In this 
case, the standard deviation for the value portfolio equals 19.2 percent compared to 
17.8 percent for the growth portfolio. Hence, the value portfolio is a bit more risky, 
but this difference in standard deviation explains at maximum only one fifth of the 
value premium.11  
 
The value portfolio’s higher upside risk is further illustrated in Table 4. The table 
shows that the value portfolio generally outperformed in the good years of the 
market. The out performance is considerable from an economic point of view. 
 
                                           
11 The mean stock market return divided by the standard deviation is around 0.5 in the 20th century (Nielsen and Risager 
(2001)), which is in line with estimates for other markets. With a difference in adjusted standard deviations that equals 
1.4 percent, the higher volatility can explain about 0.7 percentage points of the premium, that is, less than one fifth.  
 10
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Year Premium
The best year 1972 0.046 
The 2nd best year 1983 0.298 
The 3rd best year 1988 0.425 
The 4th best year 1997 0.118 
The 5th best year 1975 -0.044 
Average of 2 best years 0.172 
Average of 5 best years 0.169 
Average of 10 best years 0.143 
Average of 15 best years 0.082 
1) Using the Trailing P/E method  
Table 4: Value Premium in the best 
stock market years1)
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12 Estimated by using the covariances in Table 3 and the variance Table 5: Value Premium in the worst 
stock market years1)  Year Premium
The worst year 1984 0.212 
The 2nd worst year 2002 0.112 
The 3rd worst year 1986 0.032 
The 4th worst year 1974 -0.047 
The 5th worst year 1992 -0.157 
Average of 2 worst years  0.162 
Average of 5 worst years 0.030 
Average of 10 worst years 0.029 
Average of 15 worst years 0.013 
1) Using the Trailing P/E method  
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surprising given that small caps have little weight in the market return.13 The failure 
of the CAPM to explain the value premium parallels the findings in Fama and French 
(1992) who summarize their research by noting that “our tests do not support the 
most basic prediction of the CAPM model, that average stock returns are positively 
related to market betas.”   
 
If value stocks under perform in other bad states of the world in which the marginal 
utility of wealth is high, one could still argue that the premium primarily is a reward 
for risk. We therefore first identify the times when value stocks under perform 
growth stocks. We then check whether these periods are recessions or otherwise bad 
states of the economy in which the marginal utility of wealth is high.  
 
Column 1 in Table 6 identifies the time periods in which the value premium is 
negative and column 2 records the average magnitude of the under performance. 
Column 3 characterizes the state of the macro economy and column 4 presents the 
average real GDP growth as an indicator of the macroeconomic performance. Similar 
results are obtained when we look at private consumption. 
 
The results for the 1950s and the 1960s show that value stocks under perform when 
the economy is doing exceptionally well. In the first two decades of the sample 
period there is therefore no support to the risk based explanation. 
 
 
The story is different in the 1970s and in the 1980s. The negative value premium now 
coincides with a distressed and poorly performing macro economy. That is certainly 
the case around the first OPEC shock and in the aftermath of the second OPEC 
shock. Moreover, value stocks also strongly under perform in the early 1990s where 
growth is weak albeit still in positive territory. The slowing of the economy in the 
early 1990s is essentially due to a Danish austerity package, including a strong tax 
incentive to increase private savings in order to tackle a growing current account 
deficit (Andersen et al. (1999)). That led to a severe banking crisis and because banks 
entered the value portfolio in the early 1990s, this is important in explaining the 
negative premium in this time period. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
13 In passing, it should be noted that for the CAPM to be able to explain the value premium, the difference between the 
betas would have to be as large as one, disregarding the tendency for the value portfolio to have more upside risk than 
the growth portfolio. 
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        Table 6: The Value Premium and the Macro Economy.14
Years with a 
Negative 
Premium 
Average 
Annual 
Premium 
Performance of the Economy GDP Growth 
1953: 1 year -0.004 Strong GDP growth. 1953:0.061 
1959-61: 3 
consecutive years 
-0.040 In this period growth is strong. The 
mean growth rate at 0.066 exceeds 
the average/trend growth rate at 
0.038 over the period 1950 to 1970. 
1959: 0.081 
1960: 0.061 
1961:  0.056 
Mean:0.066  
1963-64: 2 
consecutive years 
-0.015 Recession in 1963. Strong rebound 
of the economy in 1964. Mean 
growth is above trend. 
 
1963:-0.011 
1964: 0.110 
Mean:0.050 
1969-70: 2 
consecutive years 
-0.018 Growth is upbeat in 1969 but is 
slowing in 1970. Mean growth above 
trend. 
1969: 0.063 
1970: 0.020 
Mean:0.042 
1973-76: 4 
consecutive years 
-0.094 Weak economy. Recession in 1974 
and in 1975. A hike in the oil price 
and in wages is key explanatory 
factors. Low mean growth. 
1973: 0.042 
1974:-0.004 
1975:-0.020 
1976: 0.058 
Mean:0.019 
1981: 1 year -0.137 Recession. Sharp fall in GDP.  1981:-0.020 
1989-92: 4 
consecutive years 
-0.174 Weak economy following an 
austerity package in 1986/87, incl. a 
sharp rise in (after tax) interest rates. 
Financial sector crisis. Mean growth 
rate below trend. 
 
1989: 0.009 
1990: 0.011 
1991: 0.005 
1992:-0.001 
Mean:0.006 
1999-01: 3 
consecutive years 
-0.157 Strong macro performance. Mean 
GDP growth above trend growth. 
1999: 0.029 
2000: 0.035 
2001: 0.018 
Mean:0.028 
2004: 1 year -0.084 Recovery of the economy. 2004: 0.017 
 
 
The value premium again turns negative from 1999 to 2001. This time the under 
performance is an international phenomenon.15  In these years, the macro economy is 
doing well with growth above the estimated long-term trend. Finally, the premium is 
also negative in 2004, which is a year with a healthy recovery of the economy.  
 
In sum, there are 9 time periods with a negative value premium. In 3 instances, the 
negative premium coincides with a bad state of the macro economy (around the first 
                                           
14 Source: Adam Databank, Statistics Denmark. 
15 Chan et al. (2000) explains the negative premium for the US by a change in investor sentiment rather than by a 
change in underlying fundamentals simply because growth stocks did not post superior earnings growth. 
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and the second OPEC shock and in the early 1990s). In the other 6 instances the 
macro economy is doing well. In other words, one can not argue that value stocks 
systematically under perform when growth is weak.16
 
The above analysis focused on the extent to which a negative premium coincides with 
a weak macro economy. Now we turn this around and ask whether recessions 
coincide with a negative premium? Over the sample period 1950-2004, GDP growth 
is negative in 8 years.17 In 5 of these years the value premium is also negative. 
However, the mean of the premium in the 8 recession years is positive and equal to 
1.0 percent. In other words, value stocks have not been a poorer hedge against 
recessions. We obtain similar results when we look at fluctuations in private 
consumption and industrial production (not shown). These results are similar to the 
ones for the US (Lakonishok et al. (1994)). 
 
IV. Do High P/E Stocks often Disappoint Investors? 
This section shows that Danish growth stocks tend to have better earnings 
performance before than after portfolio formation, which is also a feature of US data 
(Lakonishok et al. (1994)). Next we extend the literature by estimating the extent to 
which this can explain the under performance of growth stocks. 
 
Table 7 summarizes the evidence on earnings growth for the two portfolios. To 
explain the results consider first the 3-year window. Earnings growth 3 years before 
portfolio formation is the geometric average annual earnings growth rate 3 years 
before formation. Earnings growth rates are overlapping for efficiency reasons, but 
the spirit of the results is the same in the case of non-overlapping data. Earnings 
growth 3-year after formation is defined analogously to ex-ante earnings growth. 
 
Earnings growth 3-year ahead of portfolio formation equals 10.0 percent for the value 
portfolio, whereas earnings growth after formation is roughly the same though a bit 
higher. The picture is different for the growth portfolio. Earnings growth is much 
higher prior to than after portfolio formation. Table 7 shows that the decline in 
earnings growth equals 8.7 percentage points.  
 
 
 
 
                                           
16 Another way to look at this is to note that the premium is negative in 21 years. In 13 of these years, the macro 
economy is doing very well. Thus, the under performance of value stocks is not particularly related to downturns. 
17 Real GDP is falling in 1955, 1963, 1974, 1975, 1980, 1981, 1992, and in 1993. In 1963, 1974, 1975, 1981, and in 
1992, the value premium is negative.  
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Table 7: Average Earnings Growth Before & After Portfolio              
Formation, 1950-20041)
3 Years Before & 3 Years After 
  Before After 
Low P/E 0.100 (0.205) 0.117 (0.222) 
High P/E 0.154 (0.147) 0.067 (0.159) 
2 Years Before & 2 Years After 
  Before After 
Low P/E 0.136 (0.283) 0.094 (0.434) 
High P/E 0.181 (0.292) 0.074 (0.173) 
1 Year Before & 1 Year After 
  Before After 
Low P/E 0.064 (0.702) 0.278 (0.865) 
High P/E 0.431 (0.635) 0.123 (0.357) 
1) Earnings growth rates are geometric rates and numbers in brackets are     
standard deviations. 
 
The results for the growth portfolio at the 2-year window are even stronger. However, 
in this case, the value portfolio has also lower earnings growth after portfolio 
formation though the difference is much smaller than for growth stocks. 
 
At the 1-year window, the growth portfolio is associated with a huge decline in 
earnings growth after portfolio formation. The decline equals 30.8 percentage points 
and this decline is also statistically significant given that the t-statistic equals 2.50. 
The strong earnings growth prior to formation could have lured investors into buying 
growth stocks, which they may later regret due to the disappointing return 
performance. The picture is different for value stocks with low earnings growth prior 
to formation but high earnings growth after portfolio formation.18
 
                                           
18 However, since the t-statistic of the earnings growth differential equals 1.13 one cannot say that value stocks have 
significantly better earnings performance after portfolio formation. The moderate t-statistic is essentially due to value 
stocks’ high earnings volatility. The high earnings volatility of the value portfolio is likely to reflect the role of financial 
stocks, which often (but not always) appear in the value portfolio. These stocks are associated with large ups and downs 
in earnings due to - amongst other things - portfolio valuation effects.  
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Next we estimate the proportion of the premium that can be explained by the 
difference in earnings growth before and after portfolio formation.19 To this end we 
assume first that there is a linear relationship between returns and the earnings growth 
difference. We begin by running a regression with the 3-year return from t to t+3 as 
the dependent variable and the corresponding 3-year earnings growth differential as 
the explanatory variable.20 Figure 4 plots the data for the growth portfolio at the 3-
year window. As will be confirmed below, low earnings growth after portfolio 
formation is associated with a low stock market return. 
 
 
Figure 4: Earnings growth differential and returns for the 
growth portfolio
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Because we work with overlapping data we use Newey-West estimates of standard 
errors in the regressions since overlapping data are likely to introduce serial 
correlation in the error term. For both the value and the growth portfolio we obtain 
the expected result. If earnings growth after portfolio formation is lower than 
earnings growth before formation returns tend to fall. The results are reported in 
Table 8, which shows that the coefficient to the earnings differential variable is in the 
                                           
19 Ideally, we should use the difference between expected and actual earnings growth. However, since data on expected 
earnings growth are not available over the long time horizon we work with, we have had to use the observed earnings 
differential between past and future earnings growth. 
 
20 The latter is defined as annualized earnings growth from t-3 to t minus annualized earnings growth from t to t+3. 
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same range for the two portfolios. Due to that we also present estimates based on 
pooling the data.21 The pooled regression equation is given as, 
 
 
 3-year returnt,t+3 =  
 
      0.113 –0.126((3-year earnings growth)t-3,t – (3-year earnings growth)t,t+3), 
     (0.0162)   (0.0493) 
                                    R2 = 0.10, CHI2 = 3.45 (Pr = 0.179)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The estimation results show that the coefficient to the earnings differential variable is 
more than 2 standard errors away from zero and is therefore statistically significant.22 
We have also experimented with the squared and the cubic of the explanatory 
variable to catch potential non-linear effects, but these variables are highly 
insignificant and have therefore been taken out again. This is in line with the result 
that we can not reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity, see White’s CHI2 test 
statistic at 3.45. 
 
Let us then estimate how much the 3-year earnings disappointment variable can 
explain of the mean value premium. To this end we note that the average 3-year 
earnings growth differential equals 8.7 percent for the growth portfolio (Table 7). 
And with a coefficient estimate at -0.126, the disappointing earnings performance has 
reduced the mean return on the growth portfolio by 1.10 percentage points. The good 
ex-post earnings growth performance of value stocks has led to an increase in the 
value portfolio’s return by 0.21 percentage points. Altogether, 1.3 percentage points 
of the value premium or roughly 30 percent is explained by this model, see Table 8. 
The low R2 of the equation tells us that the model is not good at explaining the return 
variability in general, but the model does have power in explaining differences in 
mean returns across value and growth portfolios. Regardless of whether we pool the 
data or not, results at the 3-year window suggest that the earnings disappointment 
variable can explain around 30 percent of the premium. 
 
The results at the 1-year window are stronger, see Table 8. This is not surprising 
given that growth stocks produce a large decline in earnings growth after portfolio 
                                           
21 In the 3-year case, we have observations from 1953 to 2001, that is, 98 overlapping observations. However, in 3 cases 
the earnings growth variable is behaving in such an extreme manner that those 3 observations have been removed (this 
is when earnings e.g. move from a large negative number to a large positive number preventing a meaningful 
calculation of earnings growth). The regressions is therefore based on 95 pooled observations.  
22 Numbers in brackets are Newey-West standard errors. The bandwith is set to 4 (number of lags plus one), but results 
are not very sensitive to this assumption. The Newey-West standard errors are indeed higher than the OLS estimates. 
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formation at this horizon. The separate growth portfolio equation shows that the 
decline in earnings growth after portfolio formation explains as much as 66 percent of 
the value premium. When the data are pooled the results show that the earnings 
growth differential explains 79 percent of the value premium.  
 
Table 8: Earnings Growth Before & After Portfolio Formation and 
the Value Premium 
 
Estimate of 
coefficient to 
earnings growth 
differential 
Bandwidth 
Newey-West 
standard 
error 
Share of mean value 
premium explained by 
mean earnings growth 
differential1)
3-year window 
Pooled regression 
Separate Growth 
estimation 
Separate Value 
estimation 
 
-0.1255** 
 
-0.1615**
        
       -0.0962 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
0.0493 
 
0.0711 
 
0.0579 
 
 
 
 
2-year window 
Pooled regression 
Separate Growth 
estimation 
Separate Value 
estimation 
 
-0.1086**
 
-0.1483**
        
       -0.0929*
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
0.0402 
 
0.0515 
 
0.0523 
 
 
 
 
1-year window 
Pooled regression 
Separate Growth 
estimation 
Separate Value 
estimation 
 
-0.0639**
 
-0.0894**
        
        -0.0498 
 
           2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0.0292 
 
0.0249 
 
0.0396 
 
 
 
 
0.31 
0.33 
0.14 
0.31 
0.79 
0.66 
**(*) Significant at the 5 (10) percent level 
1) These shares assume that the explanatory variable is significant at the 5% level (otherwise the      
contribution is set to zero). 
 
 
The last result we want to point attention to is puzzling at first glance: Earlier we 
found that value investors benefit from using the most recent earnings data, see Table 
1. Thus, when end-of-year P relative to current E are used for picking stocks, value 
investors obtain a higher return than when they use last year’s E. But that is not the 
case for growth investors. They benefit from using outdated earnings information, 
that is, the return to the growth portfolio is higher in the trailing P/E case (11.0 
percent) than in the current P/E case (10.3 percent). One explanation for this result is 
that growth investors who avoid picking the shares with the highest P/E multiples 
also avoid choosing those stocks that are associated with the biggest earnings and 
return disappointment. 
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V. Conclusions 
There is an extensive literature that has documented the existence of a value premium 
not only for the United States but also for several other markets. Stocks with low 
price-earnings multiples, price-book values and other measures of value are reported 
to have given a higher mean return than growth stocks. However, since the results 
outside the United States are less robust due to at maximum two decades of data 
observations, there is a need for more research on European and Asian markets.  
 
This paper has researched the extent to which there is a value premium also on the 
Danish market. To this end we have collected accounting and stock market data for 
the period 1950 to 2004. The long sample enables us to test whether the value 
premium is a stylized fact or just a phenomenon that pops up now and then. The 
paper has focused on value and growth portfolios formed on the basis of stocks’ 
price-earnings multiples.  
 
The results show that the value premium is positive in the majority of the 10-year 
periods though the premium displays considerable volatility even across decades. The 
mean annual premium is in the range 4.2 % to 5.7 % (depending on the nature of the 
portfolio selection methodology), but had we only worked with short sample periods 
like in Chan et al. (1991) and Fama and French (1998), the premium would have been 
much higher underscoring the point that we need long samples in order to be able to 
extract robust insights. The premium is statistically significant in spite of its 
volatility. That said, it should also be noted that the premium is under attack in the 
early 1990s, due to a banking crisis, and in the late 1990s, due to high investor 
appetite for growth stocks. In the new Millennium, the premium recovers to previous 
highs. 
 
Why do we have a value premium? One potential explanation is that value stocks are 
more risky than growth stocks. To analyze this we focused on three different risk 
measures. The conclusion on the CAPM inspired risk analysis is that the value 
portfolio has out performed the growth portfolio in extreme down markets. Moreover, 
the value portfolio has also more upside risk than the growth portfolio. The CAPM 
model’s lack of success in explaining the value premium parallels the findings for the 
US (Fama and French (1992)). The paper also looked into macroeconomic risk. If 
value stocks under perform in recessions in which the marginal utility of wealth is 
high one can still argue that the premium is a reward for risk. In the 8 recessions over 
the period 1950-2004, the value portfolio under performed in 5 of them. On average, 
the mean value premium remains, however, in positive territory. Hence, value 
portfolios are not a poorer hedge against sharp macroeconomic downturns. The only 
factor that really points to a risk explanation is the value portfolio’s higher standard 
deviation, which is a feature also of US data. However, when we adjust for the value 
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portfolio’s higher upside risk, the higher standard deviation appears to explain at 
maximum 20 percent of the premium. There could, however, be other aspects of risk 
that the annual data do not capture. This is therefore an issue that deserves more 
attention in future work.  
 
The alternative view is that growth companies often disappoint the stock market 
simply because they cannot persistently deliver the expected high earnings growth. A 
first test of this idea is to compare earnings growth before and after portfolio 
formation. If growth stocks have much higher earnings growth in the run-up to 
portfolio formation, there is a basis for arguing that growth stocks could have 
disappointed investors (Lakonishok et al. (1994) and LaPorta et al. (1997)). It is 
interesting that this tendency has also played out for more than half a century in the 
Danish market. We have therefore extended the literature by also estimating the 
proportion of the value premium that can be explained by the difference in earnings 
growth before and after portfolio formation. The econometric results depend on the 
time horizon but suggest that growth stocks’ earnings disappointment is a more 
important factor in explaining the value premium than risk though the latter also 
plays a role. 
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